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REVIEW
Receptor binding and transmission studies of H5N1
influenza virus in mammals
Hanjun Zhao1,2, Jie Zhou1, Shibo Jiang3,4 and Bo-Jian Zheng1
The H5N1 influenza A virus that is currently circulating in Asia, Africa and Europe has resulted in persistent outbreaks in poultry with
sporadic transmission to humans. Thus far, it is believed that H5N1 does not possess sufficient ability for human-to-human
transmission and subsequent pandemic infection. Both receptor binding specificity and virus infectivity are key factors in determining
whether influenza A virus becomes pandemic. The use of human viral isolates in various studies has helped to illustrate the changes in
receptor binding specificity and virulence as a result of adaptation in humans. In this review, we highlight the important amino acids
and domains of viral proteins related to receptor binding specificity that have been reported for humans and avians using mammalian
models. Thus, this review will consolidate findings from studies that have shed light on the receptor binding and transmission
characteristics of the H5N1 influenza virus, with the goal of improving our ability to predict the transmission efficiency or pandemic
potential of new viral strains.
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INTRODUCTION
The highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus was first
isolated from sick geese in southern China in 1996.1 As of October 8th,
2013, outbreaks of H5N1 influenza across the globe have resulted in
millions of deaths in birds and 377 deaths (mortality rate of 59.3%) in
humans.2 The first reported cases of H5N1 virus infection in humans
occurred in Hong Kong in 1997, which coincided with an outbreak of
the virus in the territory’s chicken farms.3,4 More than 15 years after
this outbreak, other avian H5N1 virus strains have not acquired the
level of transmissibility and replication required to cause a human
pandemic. Nonetheless, in anticipation of this possibility, much atten-
tion has been focused on transmission and adaptation of avian H5N1
virus in humans and the potential increase in virulence caused by
amino acid mutations in viral proteins.
Recently, the geographic distribution of avian H5N1 virus infection
has expanded to Kazakstan, Mongolia, Djibouti, Egypt, Turkey and
Russia, indicating that more of the world’s population is at risk.5
However, the determinants of infection and susceptibility of humans
to H5N1 virus have not been fully elucidated. To become a pandemic
virus, the viral strain should be able to transmit efficiently between
humans, which is determined by factors such as whether the virus
grows to high enough titers in the human lungs.6,7 Fortunately, the
current H5N1 virus strains have not acquired such abilities in humans.
However, two recent experimental studies have shown that reassortant
H5N1 viruses with four mutations in hemagglutinin (HA) were cap-
able of droplet transmission in a ferret model.8,9 Therefore, the poten-
tial risk does exist for a natural H5N1 virus to evolve into a pandemic
virus after continuous circulation between avian and human hosts,
which will provide opportunities for the acquisition of the necessary
amino acid mutations in viral proteins, particularly HA.
This review will focus on studies reporting on the receptor binding
of H5N1 virus in humans and other mammals, as well as the amino
acid mutations in viral proteins related to transmission of the virus in
humans and experimental animals. In virus binding studies, the
attachment of viruses can be directly measured by labeling viruses
and then applying them to tissue sections in a method coined virus
histochemistry, which has been used to study the pattern of virus
attachment in different tissues. By comparing virus binding and trans-
mission in different animal models, this knowledge will help to elu-
cidate potential transmission routes and will provide the genetic basis
for predicting whether a mutated virus strain may evolve into a pan-
demic virus.
VIRAL RECEPTOR BINDING AND TRANSMISSION IN HUMANS
One important aspect of influenza virus infection is the interaction
between the viral surface glycoprotein HA and the corresponding
receptor on host cells. To infect host cells, influenza virus utilizes
HA to bind to complex glycans on the host cell surface via a terminal
sialic acid (SA). Influenza viruses have different preferences for SAs
with different linkages. For example, human influenza virus prefers
sialic acid linked to galactose via an a-2,6 bond (SAa-2,6Gal), whereas
avian influenza virus prefers the terminus with sialic acid linked to
galactose via an a-2,3 bond (SAa-2,3Gal).10 SAa-2,6Gal is the major
linkage for vicinal galactose in the human upper respiratory epithe-
lium.11 Epithelial cells in the paranasal sinuses, pharynx, trachea and
bronchi mainly express SAa-2,6Gal, which is also expressed in ciliated
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and goblet cells in the human lung.12,13 Apart from SAa-2,6Gal, the
human respiratory tract also expresses SAa-2,3Gal on non-ciliated
cuboidal bronchiolar cells, which are situated at the junction between
the respiratory bronchiole and alveolus.11 Highly pathogenic avian
H5N1 virus labeled by fluorescein isothiocyanate (FITC) was shown
to preferentially attach to type-II pneumocytes, alveolar macrophages,
and non-ciliated cuboidal epithelial cells in the terminal bronchioles
of the human lower respiratory tract.14 The binding of H5N1 virus
rarely occurs at the trachea and upper respiratory tract, which is con-
sistent with pathological findings observed at autopsy, such as diffuse
alveolar damage, interstitial pneumonia, focal hemorrhage, and
bronchiolitis.15,16
Some strains of the highly pathogenic H5N1 virus, such as A/Hong
Kong/486/97 (HK486) or A/Duck/Hong Kong/200/01, show high
binding affinity to SAa-2,3Gal but not SAa-2,6Gal. However, some
other strains isolated from patients, such as A/Hong Kong/212/03 and
A/Hong Kong/213/03 (HK213), can recognize both SAa-2,3Gal and
SAa-2,6Gal.17,18 These findings implicate the ability of H5N1 virus,
which preferentially binds to SAa-2,3Gal, to switch to SAa-2,6Gal if
the virus is transmitted and begins to adapt to humans. However,
efficient replication of H5N1 virus can only occur in the lower, rather
than upper, respiratory tract, implicating that the virus may not be
readily spread by sneezing and coughing.11,19 Thismay account for the
inefficient human-to-human transmission of H5N1 virus. The H5N1
virus was also shown to infect nasopharyngeal and oropharyngeal
epithelia, which do not express SAa-2,3Gal, suggesting that other
binding sites on nasopharyngeal and oropharyngeal epithelia may be
able to mediate virus entry.20
Among the 16 HA subtypes, only the H1, H2 and H3 subtypes have
become adapted to humans.21,22 These three virus subtypes caused the
pandemics of 1918, 1957, 1968 and 2009. The particular mutations
within the HA viral protein of these pandemic viruses, which contrib-
uted to the adaptation of avian influenza virus to humans, have been
identified. H1 of the 1918 pandemic H1N1 virus switched its binding
from SAa-2,3Gal to SAa-2,6Gal via the E190D and G225D mutations
(H3 numbering) in HA.23 The H2N2 and H3N2 pandemic viruses
were avian-human reassortant viruses.24 The 1957 and 1968 pandemic
H2 and H3 viruses were able to switch their binding specificity from
SAa-2,3Gal to SAa-2,6Gal via two amino acid changes of Q226L and
G228S (H3 numbering) within HA.25 When these mutations were
introduced into H5 HA of A/Vietnam/1203/04 (VN1203),22 the
E190D and G225Dmutations abolished H5HA binding to all glycans,
while the Q226L and G228S mutations afforded H5 HA binding to
natural human SAa-2,6Gal. However, a complete shift from SAa-
2,3Gal to SAa-2,6Gal binding preference was not observed.
Further studies showed that these two mutations (Q226L and
G228S) combined with a loss of glycosylation at 158N26 and the
K193R27 mutation could enhance the binding affinity to SAa-
2,6Gal. Some other HA mutations in the rHK486 and rVN1203
viruses were shown to result in a binding shift from SAa-2,3Gal to
SAa-2,6Gal.28 Although receptor preferences of the viral mutants were
changed by HA mutations in this study, almost all virus mutants
exhibited attenuated infection efficiency in vitro and in vivo. These
studies indicated that switching the binding preference of H5N1 virus
from SAa-2,3Gal to SAa-2,6Gal by mutation in HA was possible;
however, a single mutation in HA was unable to benefit the H5N1
virus because these artificial virus mutants could not replicate and
transmit efficiently, either in vitro or in vivo. In nature, some H5N1
isolates from human patients have acquired the ability to increase
their binding to SAa-2,6Gal while maintaining a decreased binding
capability for SAa-2,3Gal.18,29 These viruses were highly pathogenic,
even though efficient transmission was not observed. In addition, the
A134V mutation emerged during the course of virus replication in a
fatal case of human infection, and this mutation was shown to increase
the binding ability to SAa-2,6Gal.30 Thus, with continual circulation
of H5N1 viruses between avian and human hosts, a new pandemic
virus may emerge after the virus obtains suitable binding and efficient
replication ability.
VIRAL RECEPTOR BINDING IN MICE
Mice are themost common animal species used in experimental influ-
enza research, although most human virus strains require adaptation
in mice through serial passages and transmit inefficiently frommouse
to mouse.31 H5N1 virus can replicate robustly in BALB/c mouse lungs
to reach high titers and cause lethal disease without prior adaptation.
Studies of FITC-labeled H5N1 virus binding in the lung tissue of mice
showed that H5N1 virus mainly binds to the tracheal epithelia and
becomes progressively weaker in binding toward the alveoli,32 a pat-
tern of binding opposite to that of the human respiratory tract. This is
consistent with the observation thatmouse tracheal epithelia preferen-
tially express SAa-2,3Gal but not SAa-2,6Gal.13 Thus, the mouse
model is suitable for studying the transmission and pathogenicity of
influenza viruses that preferentially bind to the receptor via SAa-
2,3Gal linkage33 but is inappropriate for the investigation of H5N1
virus transmission in humans.
The HK213 virus exhibits binding affinity to both SAa-2,3Gal and
SAa-2,6Gal. When the HA and NA of this virus were substituted with
the HA and NA of VN1203, the recombinant virus demonstrated excel-
lent binding affinity for synthetic a-2,3-linked SA receptor, resulting in
expanded organ tropism and increased lethality in mice. In contrast,
recombinant VN1203 virus, in which HA was substituted with the HA
of HK213, showed reduced lethality and systemic spread in mice.34 In
addition, a human H5N1 virus isolate with the mutation HA222E
was mainly confined to the mouse lung, although virus with the
HA222K mutation could be isolated from the mouse brain. In particu-
lar, the HA222E variant showed a reduced binding affinity for synthetic
a-2,3Gal-linked SA receptor analogues compared to that of HA222K.35
These studies show that HA plays an important role in viral tropism,
which can be attributed to the HA binding preference for SAa-2,3Gal-
or SAa-2,6Gal-linked receptors as well as the virulence of avian influ-
enza virus in mice. However, because it has been demonstrated that
other viral proteins also play a role in viral organ tropism in mice, HA is
not the only element affecting viral organ tropism.19,35–37
VIRAL RECEPTOR BINDING AND TRANSMISSION IN FERRETS
Ferrets demonstrate preferential expression of SAa-2,6Gal and a lesser
amount of SAa-2,3Gal on epithelial cells of the respiratory tract. A
receptor binding study of H5N1 virus in ferrets showed that H5N1
virus rarely attaches to the trachea and bronchi, occasionally attaches
to non-ciliated cuboidal cells in the bronchioles, and predominantly
attaches to type II pneumocytes in the alveoli.32 These animals were
shown to be an ideal model for transmission studies of H5N1 virus
because H5N1 virus preferentially attaches to the lower respiratory
tract in ferrets, a binding pattern similar to humans.11,14 Thus far, the
transmission of H5N1 virus from avians to humans or humans to
humans has been inefficient; instead, patients have contracted the
disease primarily through close contact with birds or poultry or the
consumption of raw infected duck blood.16 It remains unclear whether
humans can be infected through contact or inhalation of aerosols from
H5N1 virus-infected patients.
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Using ferrets as an animal model, the transmission ability of H5N1
virus was analyzed in recent studies.29,38,39 In these studies, efficient-
transmission H3N2 and poor-transmission H5N1 virus strains were
reassorted to generate mutant viruses. H3N2 reassortant virus (con-
taining HA and NA of human H3N2 virus and the internal protein
genes of avian H5N1 virus) exhibited efficient infection but inefficient
transmission in ferrets by contact. H5N1 reassortant virus (containing
HA and NA of avian H5N1 virus and the internal protein genes of
human H3N2 virus) exhibited reduced infection and no transmission
by contact.38 In addition, native reassortants were simulated by coin-
fecting ferrets with avian H5N1 and human H3N2 viruses; the results
revealed various reassortants in airways extending toward and within
the upper respiratory tract of ferrets, but only parental H5N1 virus was
found in lung tissues. In addition, theH5 reassortants showed reduced
titers in nasal secretions compared to the parental H5N1 virus, and no
transmission was detected by direct contact between infected and
native ferrets.39 However, in a recent study, a reassortant virus con-
taining H5 HA and a human influenza virus NA with an H5N1 virus
background demonstrated respiratory droplet transmission in one of
two contact ferrets.40 In addition, a genetically modified H5N1 virus
with four amino acid substitutions at H103Y, T156A, Q222L, and
G224S (H5 numbering) in HA and one in PB2 (E627K) was shown
to be an airborne-transmissible virus in ferrets.9 Furthermore, an H5
HA/H1N1 reassortant virus, which was comprised of H5 HA with the
four mutations N158D, N224K, Q226L and T318I (H3 numbering)
and the remaining seven gene segments from a 2009 pandemic H1N1
virus, was capable of droplet transmission in a ferret model.8
These reassortant viruses could preferentially recognize human-type
receptors and resulted in efficient infection in ferrets, although they did
not cause mortality in infected animals. These results suggest that only
surface proteins of human virus are unable to confer H5N1 virus with
transmission ability between ferrets, even though these reassortants
could attach and replicate in the upper respiratory tract. Moreover,
the reassortant viruses with mutant H5 HA could cause droplet trans-
mission in ferrets, suggesting that H5N1 virus with pandemic potential
may emerge with continuous viral circulation and evolution.
VIRAL RECEPTOR BINDING AND TRANSMISSION IN CATS
Previous studies have shown that cats can be infected by human or
avian influenza A viruses but do not show any signs of disease.41,42
However, during the outbreaks in Thailand, avian influenza A H5N1
virus was found to infect and caused many fatalities in tigers and
domestic cats.43 After the susceptibility of cats to human isolates of
the H5N1 viruses was proven,44,45 the scientific community began to
realize the importance of understanding the transmission and patho-
genicity of H5N1 viruses in cats. Based on experiments conducted on
virus attachment, H5N1 virus does not bind to the trachea of cats, but
rather preferentially binds to type II pneumocytes as well as alveolar
macrophages, which is similar to the binding pattern in humans.14,32
This indicates that cats can be a useful animal model for studying
H5N1 viral pneumonia in humans.14 Both inhalation and ingestion
seem to be possible routes for feline infection by H5N1 virus.44,46 In
addition, indirect viral transmission to cats through contact with con-
taminated bird feces and horizontal transmission from experimentally
inoculated cats to other healthy cats represent possible routes of infec-
tion.47,48 Although no evidence has shown that cats can transmit the
virus to other species by contact, the epidemiological role of cats
requires additional study because pet cats can roam freely among
birds, poultry and humans, thus potential linking transmission
through hosts when an influenza pandemic occurs.
VIRAL RECEPTOR BINDING IN PIGS
Pigs have been traditionally been considered efficient mixing vessels
for avian and human influenza A viruses, and both SAa-2,6Gal and
SAa-2,3Gal can be detected in the porcine trachea by lectin histochem-
istry.49 Moreover, some avian-human reassortant viruses have been
isolated frompigs.50 A recent study showed that only human influenza
A virus strains have the ability to attach to the porcine trachea, whereas
H5N1 virus cannot attach to the trachea of pigs.32 One possible reason
for this distinction is that the lectin histochemistry technique is only
an indirect measure of influenza A virus binding to host tissues and
thus cannot account for other variables that may influence binding
between the virus and host cells. Intranasal inoculation with H5N1
virus or the consumption of infected chickenmeat was unable to cause
severe influenza virus infection in pigs.Moreover, replication ofH5N1
virus was restricted to the lower respiratory tract, mainly to the bron-
chiole and alveoli.51 These results are consistent with the binding study
of H5N1 virus in pigs, which showed that H5N1 virus can only bind to
the alveolus and not the trachea, bronchus or bronchiole.32
VIRAL RECEPTOR BINDING AND TRANSMISSION IN GUINEA
PIGS
Guinea pigs, like ferrets, have been widely used as animal models for
transmission studies of influenza virus.52 Guinea pigs have both avian
and mammalian types of airway receptors, and the SAa-2,6Gal and
SAa-2,3Gal receptors are present in the nasal and tracheal areas of the
guinea pig.53 Transmission studies of H5N1 virus in guinea pigs
showed thatmutations D701Nwithin PB2 and T160AwithinHAwere
critical for the transmission of A/duck/Guangxi/35/2001 H5N1 virus
(DKGX/35) in guinea pigs. In addition, the mutation T160A was
responsible for HA binding to human like-receptors. The mutated
DKGX/35 virus was also shown to contain the Q226L and G228S
(H3 numbering) substitutions in HA, which resulted in binding to
only SAa-2,6Gal and decreased transmission among guinea pigs.54
More recently, the PA gene of SC/09(H1N1) alone was shown tomake
DK/35(H5N1) transmissible by respiratory droplets between guinea
pigs.52 Thus, guinea pigs may provide a mammalian model for H5N1
transmission studies aiming to assess the pandemic potential of H5N1
isolates.
VIRAL RECEPTOR BINDING AND TRANSMISSION IN
MACAQUES
Macaques have been studied as a non-human primate for H5N1 virus
infection in some experiments,14,55–57 and the pattern of H5N1 virus
binding in cynomolgusmacaques is similar to the viral binding pattern
in humans. However, no H5N1 virus can be detected in the trachea of
macaques, essentially because the virus preferentially binds to type I,
but not type II, pneumocytes in macaques, which is different from the
binding ofH5N1 virus in humans.14Moreover, the precise cell types to
which H5N1 virus can bind in the respiratory tract remain controver-
sial. For instance, it was reported that H5N1 virus could also be
detected in the epithelium of the trachea and bronchi of macaques,55
and these differences may have resulted from the different techniques
used in these studies. Indeed, althoughmacaquesmay provide amodel
for H5N1 receptor binding and transmission studies, ethical con-
straints, availability and cost may limit the utility of these animals
for infection studies of H5N1 virus.
CONCLUSIONS
The currently available data show thatmutations inHA of H5N1 virus
can increase the binding capacity of this viral protein for SAa-2,6Gal.58
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Furthermore, these binding and transmission studies have shown that
the binding properties of HA can affect virulence, organ tropism and
transmission in mammals. Receptor binding studies of H5N1 virus
have suggested that the H5N1 virus preferentially binds to SA via the
linkage of SAa-2,3Gal, which is mainly located on type II alveolar
epithelial cells and alveolar macrophages in the human lower airway.
Therefore, the distribution of SAa-2,3Gal may account for the limited
transmission between humans. Studies in ferrets have suggested that
human transmission of natural H5N1 viruses by contact is not effi-
cient. However, viruses isolated from ducks can be transmitted from
inoculated guinea pigs to other guinea pigs by contact, although these
animals show no signs of disease.
Due to the circulation of H5N1 virus strains such as HK212, HK213
andDKGX/35, these viruses can recognize both SAs in a-2,3Gal and a-
2,6Gal linkages. In addition, certain amino acid substitutions in HA
can switch the binding specificity of a virus from SAa-2,3Gal to SAa-
2,6Gal, which can affect organ tropism and even enable transmission
between ferrets. In contrast to H5N1 virus, the 2009 H1N1 pandemic
virus preferentially binds to the SAa-2,6Gal receptor,59 although
viruses with a D222G mutation in HA switch the viral receptor bind-
ing preference from SAa-2,6Gal to SAa-2,3Gal and were frequently
observed in the lower respiratory tracts of patients with severe clinical
outcomes.60–62 Therefore, the binding properties of influenza virus
HA to glycan receptors affect interspecies transmission, organ tropism
and virulence in the host. Thus, when regions with H5N1 in circula-
tion are continually surveyed, it should be noted if amino acid muta-
tions exist that are related to binding affinity, as this may provide early
evidence for the genesis of a pandemic virus and should contribute to
future pandemic prevention efforts.
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